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1  Introduction 
 
In 1992, the Member States of the European Community signed the Treaty on European 
Union  in  Maastricht,  one  of  the  most  remarkable  political  achievements  of  the  twentieth 
century.  However, the boldness of the Treaty was apparently more than large segments of the 
European public were ready for.  The replacement of national currencies by the euro and the 
ensuing permanent interlocking of the Member States’ national economies were particularly 
unsettling  developments  for  many  Europeans.    One  political  response  to  this  skepticism 
regarding the economic future of the European Union was the creation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997. 
 
With the introduction of the common euro currency, Member States would lose the ability to 
adjust  currency  exchange  rates  to  deal  with  economic  problems.    An  underlying  concern 
throughout the development of European Monetary Union was that Member States, deprived 
of the exchange rate monetary tool, might be tempted to amass excessive levels of debt to 
solve national economic problems.  Such high public debt would ultimately undermine the 
European Central Bank’s ability to ensure the common economic good of the monetary union, 
namely price stability, and would therefore have to be safeguarded against.  In Maastricht, 
specific  economic  convergence  criteria  were  laid  out  that  Member  States  had  to  achieve 
before  they  would  be  allowed  to  adopt  the  euro.    The  SGP  essentially  hardened  these 
standards and kept them in effect indefinitely.  The pact had the explicit goal of permanently 
maintaining fiscal and budgetary discipline amongst European Union Member States who had 
adopted the euro currency.  As adopted in 1997, it imposed a national debt limit of 60% of 
GDP, as well as a cap to the annual budget deficit of no higher than 3% of GDP.  The pact 
had  the  practical  effect  of strengthening the provisions of the Treaty  on fiscal discipline, 
particularly Articles 99 and 104, the Excessive Deficit Procedure.  These debt and deficit 
limits were regarded as the best route to achieving low inflation within the Eurozone, since 
they effectively prevented any single country from pursuing a fiscal policy incongruent with 
that of the rest of the Member States (von Hagen 2002: 3-7). 
 
Germany was easily the most influential country during the formative stage of the SGP.  It 
had played the leading role in Europe’s economy for decades.  At the time, it appeared to 
many political observers that Germany, with its strong and stable economy, had much to gain 
from such an agreement, which would ensure that other Member States would not be able to   5 
negatively affect it by pursuing unsound fiscal policy.  Indeed, the very idea of such a pact 
was initially put forward by the German finance minister, Theo Waigel. 
 
Fiscal policy is one of the most important instruments of national policy making. It certainly 
falls  under  the  category  of  “high  politics”  which  can  be  used  to  national  advantage.  
Obviously then, from a national perspective, there is a cost associated with transferring fiscal 
policy decision-making to the European supranational level.  And yet, that is precisely what 
the SGP does; by imposing limits on the allowable size of national debts and deficits, the pact 
restricts the flexibility that national politicians can make use of to deal with fiscal concerns 
facing their countries.  Even given the potential benefits to Germany, what would prompt 
such an economically strong and stable nation to willingly transfer some of its fiscal policy 
authority  to  the  supranational  level?    In  order  to  investigate  this  subject,  this  paper  will 
examine the positions taken by all the relevant actors in the German political process during 
the  creation  and  development  of  the  SGP.    In  particular,  we  will  attempt  to  answer  the 
following research question: 
 
Can the European Stability and Growth Pact be explained in a framework of ideas, 
ideologies and interests in media democracies? 
 
The question is posed in such a manner so as to determine whether the Agenda Theory can be 
used to explain this particular evolution of European fiscal governance.  Before we can begin 
to  answer  this  question,  though,  it  will  be  useful  to  examine  the  Agenda  Theory  and  its 
application to contemporary politics. 
 
1.1  Theoretical approach – Agenda Theory 
 
According to the Agenda Theory of political economy, voters are guided by self-interest; 
however, they do not have complete information and are therefore restricted in the rationality 
of their voting behavior.  To compensate for this, many voters rely on the ideologies put forth 
by political parties to assist them in deciding who to vote for (generally speaking, the lower 
the  voter’s  ability  to  absorb  all  the  information  available,  the  higher  their  propensity  for 
relying on an ideological crutch).  These ideologies provide voters with a solid foundation 
from which they can better make sense of a complex world (Heise 2005: 5).   6 
Some theories view the ideologies of political parties as mere “black boxes,” which can be 
filled with the political preferences of the median voter before an election, then altered to 
reflect shifts in public opinion before the next election.  The Agenda Theory posits that the 
development of party ideology is not merely carried out to achieve short-term success at the 
polling stations, but is rather focused on achieving a coherent and enduring party brand that 
will maintain its appeal to voters.  The successful use of such a branding technique will secure 
a long-term attachment between voter and party (Heise 2005: 5-6). 
 
However,  the  challenge  for  political  parties  is  to  get  their  messages  across  to  the  voting 
public.    In  the  modern  mass  media  environment  (consisting  primarily  of  television, 
newspapers, and the internet), it is extremely difficult for a party to achieve direct contact 
with the voters.  Most of the time, its message will have to be conveyed through the media, 
which  should  not  be  regarded  as  neutral  transmitters  of  these  messages.    Based  on  the 
ideological position and economic interests of the media, as well as the ideological position of 
the media elites (who can strongly influence the way messages are conveyed in the media), 
party  ideology  and  message  are  filtered  and  reframed  before  they  reach  their  intended 
audience (Heise 2005: 7-8). 
 
The  interaction  of  media,  political  parties,  and  voters  is  more  complex  than  this  one-
directional description, though.  Each of the three players exerts influence on the other two.  
The  attempts  by  parties  to  get  their  message  on  the  list  of  issues  that  the  media  deem 
newsworthy is referred to by Heise (2005: 8-9) as agenda building.  The media, in turn, are 
responsible  for  agenda  setting,  that  is,  determining  which  party  messages  are  worthy  of 
inclusion  in  their  products.    The  media  are  also  in  control  of  policy  agenda  setting,  by 
informing the parties of public opinion, presumably based on what issues provoke the most 
interest and passion in their viewers/readers (and therefore the highest ratings/sales figures).  
Finally, the voters themselves, often via lobbies, are responsible for policy agenda building, 
whereby they let their opinions be known to the political parties.  However, because of their 
agenda  setting  role,  the  media  has  already  played  a  major  role  in  shaping  the  policy 
orientation of the electorate (Heise 2005: 8-9). 
 
It becomes clear that the media play the largest role in this process, actively taking part in 
three of the four processes and heavily influencing the fourth.  It should therefore come as no 
surprise to see the term “media democracy” used often in reference to the current political   7 
system.  The political parties’ loss of power has been offset by the media’s gain.  In order to 
gain access to the voters through the media, politicians can no longer rely on sound policy 
alone, but must also be able to present themselves and their policies in a compelling manner 
that  readers  and  viewers  will  be  drawn  to.    In  media  democracies,  public  relations  have 
become as important as public policy (Heise 2005: 9). 
 
1.2  Outline 
 
In examining whether there is  an agenda theoretic explanation for  Germany’s role in the 
development of the SGP, it is important to consider the general political setting in Germany 
during this time.  This will perhaps shed additional light on the motivations of the various 
actors in our investigation.  For this reason, Chapter 2 will examine Germany’s role and status 
within the European Union before and during the SGP negotiations.  We will also discuss the 
unique political situation in Germany, namely the recently completed reunification, to see if 
this had any impact on the decisions made regarding the SGP. 
 
Chapter 3 will look at the main political actors, i.e. the agenda builders, who were in positions 
that provided them with the largest potential influence on the creation or blockage of the pact.  
We will begin with the Bundesbank, the German Federal Bank.  We will then turn to the 
government actors, first taking a close look at former finance minister Theo Waigel’s motives 
for making such a proposal in the first place, followed by a review of the role played by the 
Federal  Ministry  of  Finance  as  an  institutional  whole.    Continuing  our  examination  of 
government actors, we will next focus on the German political parties, both the governing 
center-right  coalition  (Christian  Democratic  Party,  Christian  Social  Union,  and  Free 
Democratic Party) and the center-left opposition (Social Democratic Party and Green Party).  
We will then look at the role prominent German academics played, in particular the German 
Council of Economic Advisors.  Finally, we will turn our attention to the German trade unions 
and employer associations. 
 
Chapter 4 will examine public opinion regarding the increasing coalescence of the European 
Union by sifting through the results of the semi-annual Eurobarometer polls.  Though the 
polling questions may not directly address the SGP, they do give a good indication of the 
public’s  general  sentiment  toward  European  integration.    Through  the  process  of  policy   8 
agenda building, such polling data will aide political parties with their agenda building, a vital 
process of the Agenda Theory. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 will focus on the role of the Agenda Theory’s most important actor, the 
media.    We  will  first  examine  the  nature  of  media  democracies  and  the  effects  of  their 
emergence upon public policy.  The portrayal of the SGP in the media will be presented and 
analyzed, along with a re-examination of public opinion regarding the SGP from a different 
vantage  point  than  that  of  Chapter  4.    Here,  we  will  give  additional  scrutiny  to  the 
complicated give and take between the media and public opinion and their influences on one 
another.    We  will  conclude  the  chapter  by  tying  our  media  findings  together  within  the 
framework of the Agenda Theory. 
 
2  Initial status in Germany 
 
Germany had not only played an important role in shaping the Treaty on European Union in 
Maastricht in 1991, but it was the moving force behind the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
and  dominated  its  negotiations.  Reunited  Germany,  being  the  most  populous  and 
economically  strongest  country  in  Europe,  surged  ahead  to  assume  joint  responsibility  in 
enforcing fiscal discipline as a permanent feature of EMU (Bundesministerium für Finanzen 
1995: 1).  
 
2.1  Germany’s role and position in the negotiations 
 
With the introduction of the D-Mark on June 20
th, 1948, the beginning of a long-lasting phase 
of  German  currency  stability  was  heralded,  which  was  of  great  importance  in  ensuring 
autonomy in monetary policy in Europe – which was the precondition for the functioning of 
the European Central Bank (ECB) (Eichel 2006: 2). 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, most European countries tied their currency to the German 
Mark to fight inflationary forces and keep their exchange rates stable. On the one hand, this 
turned out to be a successful system, leading to monetary and exchange rate stability by the 
late 1980s. On the other hand, many European states feared German superiority and their own 
dependence on the German currency. European monetary policy was de facto determined by   9 
the Bundesbank alone. This asymmetrical structure put the German position under pressure. 
Germany’s credibility was hinged to their currency policy. In the Genscher-Memorandum in 
1988, Germany indicated its willingness to further European monetary integration for the first 
time,  yet  without  giving  up  monetary  leadership  and  its  paramount  commitment  to  price 
stability (Hillenbrand 1999: 503ff.).  
 
Indeed, Germany’s power position in the negotiations of the SGP can be traced back to its 
monetary leadership for decades. Giving up its power position, Germany declared the SGP to 
be in the crucial national interest of Germany. With the introduction of the SGP, Germany 
wanted to ensure that no country would evade the ECB’s anti-inflation policy, that there was 
no free-riding by poorer Member States, and that fiscal discipline would prevent excessive 
deficits in EMU. The convergence criteria of Maastricht include two fiscal limits – the 3 
percent and 60 percent criteria – which stress the importance of fiscal policy at the European 
level and deprive the Member States of the instrument of expansive fiscal policy measures. 
The  proposal  of  German  Finance  Minister  Theo  Waigel  aimed  to  mitigate  the  imbalance 
between  national  economic  policy  and  European  currency  policy  without  questioning  the 
contractual basis laid down in the Treaty of  Maastricht. Again, Germany was accused of 
building up barriers for EMU to push through its own tradition of an independent central 
bank, price stability, and constrained fiscal policy (Hillenbrand 1999: 512ff.). Nevertheless, 
the  German  institutional  model  held  prominence  in  the  negotiations,  based  on  German 
ordoliberal ideas and the successful history of German monetary policy. After nerve-racking 
debates on how to construct EMU and SGP, which mainly focused on the aforementioned 
fiscal  criteria,  the  Council  of  Ministers  finally  agreed  to  the  SGP.  Surprisingly,  thirteen 
Member States were classified as eligible in the reference year 1997 to enter the third stage of 
EMU  –  Belgium,  Germany,  Finland,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  the  Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal and Spain. Meanwhile, Denmark and Great Britain, despite having met the 
convergence requirements, opted not to participate in EMU.  
 
Particularly for Germany with its miserable past, EMU was a milestone to prove the country’s 
commitment  to  European  integration  and  assume  responsibility  for  ensuring  peace  and 
prosperity in the European Union (Bundesministerium für Finanzen 1995: 1).  
 
   10 
2.2  German unification 
 
The reactions to German unification in 1990 were quite mixed. German unity was cause for 
great joy around the world and especially for the people of East Germany, but it came to be a 
heavy burden for the German economy. German inflation was already rising prior to 1989, 
and reunification only intensified inflationary pressures, as the exchange rate between the East 
German and West German currencies was artificially inflated to one-to-one and massive fiscal 
transfers to the former East Germany increased the money supply. The German Federal Bank 
raised  interest  rates  four  times  between  1990  and  1992,  heavily  affecting  all  European 
countries which had tied their currencies to the D-mark and creating pressure for them to 
realign  their  exchange  rates.  German  monetary  policies  were  harshly  criticized  and  the 
process towards EMU suffered a setback. But European economies recovered soon after the 
conclusion of the monetary crisis in August 1993, and the German Federal Bank was able to 
maintain its credibility (Rhodes/Mazey 1995: 259).  
 
In  addition  to  Germany’s  domestic  constraints,  which  ultimately  affected  all  European 
countries, old fears of German dominance were evoked by German unity. Germany, now the 
largest and most powerful country in the middle of Europe, was regarded as a possible threat 
to its neighbors. The urgent need to integrate Germany into Europe can therefore be explained 
as a result of the recently completed unification.  
 
Germany was expected to show full commitment to European integration. As a consequence, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was dedicated to European unity, especially during the Maastricht 
negotiations, in order to overcome history and to prevent further conflicts in Europe. Yet for 
Germany to sign the treaty, a necessary prerequisite was the implementation of the German 
model in EMU and SGP. The tradition of price stability and central bank independence was 
associated with economic prosperity, and Germany would never have agreed upon a SGP 
conflicting with these deeply rooted German ideals. In the end, the SGP turned out to be 
heavily biased toward the German institutional model. This can be explained by Germany’s 
evident monetary power and prowess, but also by its domestic institutional structures and 
actors to which we turn now in the third chapter. 
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3  Main actors 
 
When analyzing the Agenda Theory’s main actors in the shaping of German fiscal policy, 
one has to consider two “typically German principles” that both determine and shape the 
actors’ attitudes during the conceptualization of and negotiations over the SGP: the so-called 
“D-Mark  patriotism”  and  ordoliberalism.  We  will  now  briefly  describe  both  of  these 
important German values. 
 
Germany’s historic experience of two hyperinflations during the 20th century (1922/23 and 
1948)  is  one  important  reason  for  German  economic  policy’s  strong  orientation  toward 
stability since World War II. Having suffered critical restrictions to their national freedoms (a 
divided country, controlled by the allies), the Federal Republic of Germany had to redefine 
itself after the war. Shortly after 1945, the German economy embarked on an unprecedented 
boom  (known  as  the  Wirtschaftswunder,  or  “German  economic  miracle”).  The  freshly 
devastated country began to be rebuilt, bit by bit. Over the ensuing years, Germany grew to 
become the strongest economy in Western Europe. Its stable D-Mark currency became a 
common point of identification and national self-confidence. Deprived of independence in 
questions of foreign policy, the European integration process – also referred to as “reflexive 
multilateralism” (Verdun 2002: 204) – was regarded as an important step toward regaining 
credibility on the continent as well as to compensate for this lack. Although Germany could 
not participate in international interventions of the UN or within Europe for many years, they 
compensated for this restriction by making large money transfers (“soft power”), the so-
called  “check-book  diplomacy”  (Verdun  2002:  205).  This  practice  reflected  the  German 
cultural identity, which was built around two main elements: first, the self-perception as a 
civilian power on the one hand and, secondly, as a strong economy compensating for its 
restricted powers via a strong and stable D-Mark. “Germans had, for a long time after the 
war, few points of orientation or symbols of identification, and the D-Mark was the strongest 
of them by far.” (Sloam 2005: 132) When it came to the question of replacing the D-Mark 
with another currency, old fears reappeared, and people felt as though one of their most 
important  sources  of  pride,  their  country’s  economic  (monetary)  power,  was  being 
threatened. On the other hand, the country saw itself as one of the driving forces of European 
integration,  of  which  the  coordination  of  economic  and  monetary  policies  was  a  highly 
symbolic  and  historical  step.  Nonetheless,  giving  up  such  an  important  determinant  of   12 
national  identity  seemed  much  more  difficult  for  Germany  than  for  other  countries,  a 
phenomenon that Thomas Risse had described as “D-Mark patriotism” (Risse 1999: 159).  
 
Born out of the experience of political and economic failures during the Weimar Republic and 
the  Third  Reich,  combined  with  the  post-war  economic  boom,  ordoliberalism  was  the 
underlying economic ideology that shaped the German negotiations over European Monetary 
Union. The German economy was respected abroad and served as a guarantee for stability and 
self-confidence domestically which was of the utmost importance for the country’s particular 
identity.  Germany’s  economy  was  the  embodiment  of  ordoliberalism,  as  evinced  by  the 
efficient and long-term functioning of the competitive German market in combination with its 
strong independent Bundesbank committed to low inflation and price stability. Germany’s 
commitment to ordoliberalism served as a role model in Europe that paved the way to an 
Economic and Monetary Union (Dyson/Padgett 2005: 5).  
 
3.1  Bundesbank (German Federal Bank) 
 
One of the most influential actors during the creation of the Stability and Growth pact was 
undoubtedly  the  German  Bundesbank.  Indeed,  outside  of  the  German  and  the  French 
Ministries of Finance, the Bundesbank may have been the most powerful actor. Therefore, 
when trying to identify and explain the prevailing ideas in Germany on the eve of the SGP, 
one has to consider the role of the Bundesbank and its powerful position, not only within 
Germany, but also with regard to its influence upon the other Member States of the European 
Union. 
 
3.1.1  German ordoliberalism and the Bundesbank 
 
During  the  negotiations  over  the  Maastricht  Treaty  evidence  of  Germany’s  leading  role 
concerning monetary power in the European Union was on display. Germany’s successful 
push  for  the  “Europeanization  of  the  German  model  of  an  independent,  powerful  central 
bank” (Dyson 2002: 186) was driven by its sound ordoliberal convictions. The Bundesbank 
and its president, Hans Tietmeyer (1993-1999), were seen as the pre-eminent guardians of 
price stability (Dyson 2002: 186), not only in the academic and political spheres, but also in 
the public.    13 
3.1.2  First moves towards a Stability Pact 
 
After the heads of government of the Member States of the European Community had decided 
to establish a European Monetary Union, the Bundesbank gave its first statement concerning 
the EMU in September 1990. Its main recommendations in this statement were as follows:  
 
First,  the  EMU  would  irrevocably  bind  the  European  currencies  together  by  fixing  their 
exchange rates. In the next step, monetary power would have to be handed over from the 
national to the supranational, namely the European, level. The resulting solidarity community 
would need a complementary Political Union in order to function well. Thus, the first request 
from the Bundesbank was for closer political cooperation, even a political union, though it did 
not specify what this cooperation should look like, how it should be managed, or how it 
should function (Deutsche Bundesbank 1990: 5-6).  
 
Secondly, the Bundesbank highlighted in its early statement that a huge divergence between 
the Member States of the European Community existed and hence, that the envisaged EMU 
was  not  be  able  to  work  without  additional  stability.  Moreover,  the  transfer  of  monetary 
power  to  the  European  level  would  result  in  a  risk  to  stability,  especially  for  Germany. 
Consequently, efforts for greater convergence would have to be made at the European level 
and  monitored  by  the  ECOFIN-Council  and  the  European  Commission  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 1990: 7). 
 
Finally,  the  Bundesbank  demanded  a  contractual  safeguarding  of  stability-oriented  fiscal-
policy by the Member  States with clear rules  and sanctions. With this demand, the bank 
wanted to ensure that the criteria that it wanted lain down would be interpreted in a strict 
manner, meaning that there would not be any softening of such criteria through contractually 
fixed dates (Deutsche Bundesbank 1990: 9-10). 
 
In  the  following  years,  the  Bundesbank  made  another  statement  concerning  the  European 
Monetary Union and the claim for stability-oriented fiscal policy in the Member States. This 
statement must be interpreted in light of the political and economic situation in which it had 
been made.  
   14 
The 1992 statement was given just after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty and mainly 
commented upon this treaty and its major accomplishments. The Central Bank Council
1 stated 
that the decision over whether the EMU had to be established was only a political decision 
taken by the government. Even though the Bundesbank had served in an advisory function 
during the negotiations for the German government, and as a result, the Treaty was generally 
in line with the ideas of the bank, there were still some concerns that the bank wanted to 
highlight: the establishment of a Political Union was seen as an important foundation for the 
success of the Monetary Union, which not only needed a common monetary policy but also a 
common social consensus that could only be reached via a Political Union. Without such a 
union, a dispute between Member States could lead to a crucial test for the European Union, 
as there were no common structures of political decision-making that could find a solution for 
this problem (Tietmeyer 1996: 66). Furthermore, the proposed Common Market made several 
demands upon the Member States that they had to be aware of: their economic, fiscal and 
social policies would have to be amended in a way that would lead to more convergence 
concerning the price stability. Moreover, the independence of the Member State’s Central 
Banks was seen as a crucial factor for the success of EMU. Certainly, the most important 
point for the Bundesbank was the strict fulfilment of the convergence criteria
2 that had been 
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty for the selection of the Member States taking part in the 
EMU. Compliance with the entry criteria and a stability-oriented fiscal policy were far more 
important for the Bundesbank than contractually fixed dates. To sum up, the Bundesbank held 
the  very  strong  opinion  that  no  Member  State  was  to  be  allowed  to  join  the  European 
Monetary  Union  without  having  fulfilled  the  convergence  criteria  (Deutsche  Bundesbank 
1992: 11-13). 
 
Hans Tietmeyer and the Central Bank Council were the first to claim the need for a “Stability 
Pact” in 1995 and thus expressed the latently existing fear and criticism of the German public 
concerning the EMU. In January, Tietmeyer stated that only some of the Member States of the 
EU would be able to adopt the common currency on time and tied a condition to the adoption: 
the states had to accept restrictions to their national budgetary policies in order to assure a 
                                                 
1 The Central Bank Council (Zentralbankrat) is the supreme board of the German Bundesbank and is composed 
of the president and the vice-president of the Bundesbank, the members of the directorate and the presidents of 
the Federal State Central Banks (Landeszentralbanken).  
2 Those criteria, laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, are the following: the first criterion demands that the 
Member State in question has to have a high degree of price stability. Secondly, the government’s financial 
position has to be sustainable (at most, 3% government deficit in GDP at market prices and 60% ratio of 
government debt to GDP at market prices); thirdly, the Member State in question was a member of the European 
Monetary System for at least two years without any problems. The fourth criterion asks for a durable 
convergence expressed in the long-term interest-rate level (Galahan 1996: 149-152).   15 
stability-oriented  fiscal  policy.  Only  three  months  later,  he  demanded  effective  rules  and 
sanctions for the safeguarding of fiscal discipline in the EU; in other words, he claimed the 
need for a “Stability Pact” (Heipertz 2005: 59-61). The Federal Ministry of Finance – after 
meeting with Tietmeyer – then took a very similar position concerning the need for such a 
pact. However, the next step in the process of creating the official SGP was one of political 
bargaining, a step in which the Bundesbank had no more influence. The description of this 
process will be laid out in the next chapter about government and political parties (see chap. 
3.2). 
 
3.1.3  The Bundesbank – an exterior view 
 
The  last  section  presented  the  statements,  views  and  ideas  that  the  Bundesbank  had 
concerning EMU, and in particular the SGP. We will now focus on the “outside” view of the 
Bundesbank,  meaning  its  perception  in  the  public  and  its  influence  on  the  process  of 
establishing the SGP. From the analysis, we will be able to draw conclusions about its impact 
in terms of the Agenda Theory.  
 
During the 1990s, the Bundesbank had a strong and influential position. The Bundesbank law 
from 1957 gave it the position of safeguarding the currency, so there was a clear legal basis 
on  which  the  Bundesbank  could  operate  and  “define  its  role  as  guardian  of  the  stability 
foundations of EMU, ensuring that convergence was strict and sustainable” (Dyson 2002: 
200). Its excellent reputation as being the most successful central bank throughout Europe, 
coupled with the strong D-Mark, gave the Bundesbank the confidence of the global financial 
markets. Moreover, the German public trusted it. For these reasons, the German government 
decided to include the Bundesbank during the EMU negotiations, rather than leaving it out. 
The government wanted to make sure that the bank was in agreement with all of the key 
points of EMU (Dyson 2002: 200-201) and to have the bank as “a critical but constructive 
partner” (Heipertz 2001: 41).  
 
This leads to the very important observation that, during the negotiations for the SGP, the 
Bundesbank  held  an  “informal  veto  position”  (Heipertz  2005:  68),  also  referred  to  as  an 
“implicit  veto  position”.  This  position  was  based  on  the  excellent  reputation  that  the 
Bundesbank  held  with  the  public  (Heipertz  2005:  181-182).  Consequently,  a  negative   16 
statement from the bank concerning the entry into stage three of EMU
3 would have resulted in 
enormous political costs for the government (Dyson 2002: 187). Therefore, the inclusion of 
the Bundesbank in the negotiation sessions was of crucial importance for the government. 
 
3.1.4  Conclusion 
 
The German Bundesbank played its most influential role during the conceptualization stage of 
the SGP. After the idea of a “Stability Pact” was launched and then adopted by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, the Bundesbank’s role was reduced to that of a discrete advisor, rather 
than playing an important role in the public.  
 
Nevertheless, the huge influence on public opinion and the resulting informal veto position 
that the Bundesbank held were factors that could not be ignored by the German government 
and the Federal Ministry  of  Finance. The political costs to the  government of a negative 
statement by the Bundesbank would have been extremely high, due to the bank’s high esteem 
in the eyes of the public. Therefore, the government decided to include the bank as an advisor 
in the process of establishing and negotiating the SGP.  
 
Concerning  the  Agenda  Theory,  the  Bundesbank  had  a  certain  influence  with  the  media 
through its credibility as a guarantor of price stability. When the bank first stated that there 
was a need for stability-oriented fiscal policy, the media took this position and set it on the 
agenda. During the 1990s, and especially during the period of entering stage three of EMU, 
Tietmeyer appeared quite frequently in the media. Consequently, the public was undoubtedly 




                                                 
3 According to the Treaty of Maastricht, the EMU should be established in three stages: in stage one from July 
1990 until the end of 1993, the financial markets were to be liberalized and the economic policies of the Member 
States should be coordinated. In stage two, which started in 1994 and ended in 1998, there should be no further 
exchange rate adjustments to the currencies that have been bound together in the European Monetary System; 
moreover a European Monetary Institute was to be established as a precursor of a European Central Bank and all 
preparations had to be made for entering into stage three. In stage three, which began in 1999, all exchange rates 
from the countries that would take part in the EMU were fixed, the control over the common monetary policy 
was transferred to the Eurosystem, and the SGP came into force (Heipertz 2005: 56-58).    17 
3.2  German government and political parties 
 
When considering the attitude of political parties towards the discussion of the SGP, it is 
important to take two facts into account. First of all, there has always been a consensus on 
stability despite different points of view regarding the economic system. Highly inflationary 
policies, as witnessed in France until the early 1980s, for example, would never have been 
acceptable.  Secondly,  the  D-Mark  had  been  the  ancillary  currency  in  the  Economic  and 
Monetary System and therefore had already achieved a trustworthy status; giving up the D-
Mark  would  mean  abdicating  Germany’s  leading  position  in  the  EMS  for  a  currency 
dependent on different economic policy cultures.  
 
As  head  of  the  German  government  since  1982,  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  had  always 
emphasized Germany’s attachment to the European project.  He considered himself to be 
“Adenauer’s grandson” and declared his “political fate associated with it” (Sloam 2005: 138). 
The  “chancellor  of  the  reunification,”  Helmut  Kohl  wanted  to  effectively  implement  the 
larger  and  therefore  (in  the  eyes  of  most  partners)  more  threatening  Germany  into  the 
network of the European Union and its common currency project.  
 
The following text will examine the role of the government (especially the Finance Minister) 
and the political parties during the discussion of the SGP in Germany. First, a short historical 
overview of the discussion and German economic ideology will be given. Thereafter, the 
roles and the positions of the opposition and the government will be discussed, in order to 
conclude on an agenda-theoretic evaluation of their influence or performance.  
 
3.2.1  Implementation of the Stability Culture in EU Politics – From Genscher to Waigel 
 
The  Genscher-Memorandum  in  1988  served  as  a  first  draft  on  how  to  implement  the 
Economic and Monetary Union; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, proposed the introduction of a European Central Bank based on the example of the 
German Bundesbank. This was not only an important step towards the creation of the EMU, 
but Germany thereby also wanted to continue its stability-oriented monetary policy within 
the Eurozone. A few weeks later, the Delors-Report (1988/89) set the goal of an effective, 
well-functioning introduction of a common currency in Europe by 1999 (FES 1997: 96). For 
the second stage of EMU (which states should enter in January, 1994), the report foresaw the   18 
strengthening of the economic convergence as well as a higher coordination of monetary 
policies. Also, it forbade the central bank from giving credits to the public sector.  
 
For the consideration of the role of German parties and the government, two main aspects 
revealed by these initiatives have to be kept in mind. First, both initiatives were mainly 
influenced by German politicians. While the former was a national proposition, the latter had 
been initiated at the Council of Hannover in 1988 on the insistence of the Chancellor Kohl 
and the French president François Mitterand. This strong influence of the Federal Republic 
on EMU also is reflected in the second aspect: the prior criteria of stability and convergence, 
which Germany felt were crucial toward guaranteeing a strong and stable Euro, are granted 
high importance in both proposals. Furthermore, the German foreign (European) policy had - 
due to its historical and institutional setting - always been focused on integration. It is true 
that political parties had different points of view on its design and on which aspect should 
come first, economic or political union, but there was always a general cross-party consensus 
on this fact. When the SGP was being discussed, EMU was a fait accompli, the Maastricht 
Treaty was ratified and renegotiations were not even on the agenda. 
 
With  the  entry  into  stage  two  of  EMU  in  1994,  the  first  official  demands  arose  from 
politicians for a supervision of the currency’s stability. At that time, liberalization of the 
financial markets as well as closer cooperation between the national central banks regarding 
coordination of economic policies was already advancing. The increasing dissatisfaction of 
the public, as demonstrated by their fear of the Euro (see chap. 4), threatened to dominate the 
domestic  debate  on  Europe.  Additionally,  memories  of  the  EMU-crisis  in  1992/93  had 
seriously affected the German EMU leadership, which until then had gone unchallenged
4: the 
widening of the exchange rate mechanism’s (ERM) band from 2.25% to 15% was seen as 
heralding its decline. (Ahrens/Ohr 2003: 62).  
 
3.2.2  Opposition - Social Democrats and Greens 
 
From  1982  until  1998,  Germany  was  governed  by  a  Conservative-Liberal  coalition, 
composed of the CDU/CSU and the FDP. As the opposition parties, the SPD and the Green 
                                                 
4 Due to a devaluation of the British pound and the Italian lira and the unwillingness of realignment of the 
partners, both countries had to leave the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS (as it prescribed fixed exchange 
rates). A few months later, the increase of the interest rates in France and Germany led to rivalries concerning 
the role of the anchor currency.   19 
Party could not exert a strong influence on creating the concepts of the Monetary Union at 
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), even though the initiative had originally been taken 
by a social-democratic chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in 1979 (Waigel 1996: 236). Generally, 
the SPD played a much larger role concerning the SGP, since the Green Party at that time 
was just beginning to realign its political vision with the now established EMU. Having 
fought against the economically-oriented EU since its creation in the 1980s (they compared it 
to  a  corporate  group),  the  Greens  were  against  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  general.  The 
constitutional complaint in Germany against its ratification was led by an important Green 
politician and lawyer, Hans-Christian Ströbele. Thus, the Greens scarcely participated in the 
debate on the coordination of fiscal policy during the considered time, but instead criticized 
EMU and the EU in general. 
 
3.2.2.1 Constitutional renewals - a threat? 
 
After the debate on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the SPD found a way to increase its 
influence-  or  more  generally,  the  influence  of  German  opposition  parties-  on  European 
politics. In October 1992, the German constitution was revised: the Bundesrat
5 was given a 
right to veto (by two-third majority) in the case of sovereignty transfer to any international 
decision-making  body.  Hence,  in  times  when  opposition  parties  held  a  majority  in  the 
Bundesrat (which was the case since 1992), they had a more effective means of pressure on 
the government (Rhodes/Mazey 1995: 253). Since the SGP was not a primary source of law 
and was foreseen as a “common position paper,” there is no question that this influence was 
restricted to a rather symbolic or rhetorical one. But as the German public grew increasingly 
skeptical towards the Euro the closer it came, a “stab in the back” from the opposition and a 
potential blocking of European integration was much too risky for the government. 
 
3.2.2.2 1995-1996: turning of the SPD towards the anti-EMU platform? 
 
When  the  countries  entered  stage  two  of  the  Delors-Report  in  1994,  only  two  of  the 
participating countries, Germany and Luxemburg, fulfilled the fiscal convergence criteria as 
defined  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The  SPD  used  this  widespread  failing  to  criticize  the 
government: during a general debate on the budget in the German parliament in November 
                                                 
5 The second legislative chamber in Germany, composed of the prime ministers of the Länder.    20 
1995,  the  party  leader  Rudolf  Scharping  attacked  the  governing  coalition  of  leading  an 
unsound fiscal policy that might endanger the fulfillment of the convergence criteria and thus 
the  EMU.  Picking  up  the  accusations  of  the  academics  that  EMU  had  been  created  too 
quickly and was not well-planned (“mit heißer Nadel gestrickt”), they criticized the lack of a 
Political Union that Kohl and his partners had declared essential for a functioning EMU (Die 
Welt, 11.11.1995). 
 
A few days later, the SPD held its party conference in Mannheim. In his opening address, 
Commission  President  Delors  emphasized  that  neither  the  simple  compliance  with  the 
Maastricht criteria nor the creation of the ECB were sufficient to achieve fiscal stability: an 
“economic government” keeping surveillance on general macro-economic orientation was 
needed
6.  The  speeches  of  Chairman  Rudolf  Scharping  and  his  deputy  Oskar  Lafontaine 
(minister  president  of  Saarland)  both  expressed  regret  for  the  underdeveloped  Political 
Union,  although  a  general  approval  of  the  European  project  was  stressed  (Die  Welt, 
16.11.1995). Nonetheless, the issue of stability was still considered highly important- it even 
had its own place on the agenda of the conference. Echoing the Bundesbank’s criticisms, they 
claimed the convergence criteria deserved more respect than the entry into stage three within 
the given time period (1997 until no later than 1999), taking up the criticisms given by the 
Bundesbank. Scharping proposed a delay of stage three until Italy satisfied the conditions 
(“controlled delay”
7). The question of which factor should be given preference, “convergence 
or time-table,” as well as deciding how firmly the criteria should be fixed, was discussed 
within the SPD leadership as well, though not without controversy (Dyson 2002: 198): Oskar 
Lafontaine also supported the idea of a delay, since he considered the “tight fiscal policies” 
needed  for  strict  compliance  with  the  convergence  criteria  as  “costing  jobs”  (Notermans 
2001: 90), but he did not share the Bundesbank’s point of view. The minister president of 
Lower Saxony, Gerhard Schröder
8,  doubting the power of EMU to establish fiscal discipline 
in  the  participating  countries,  wanted  the  regional  elections  in  Baden-Württemberg  and 
Hamburg to serve as a “referendum on the Economic and Monetary Union” (Heipertz 2005: 
69). Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) openly criticized his own party colleagues as 
well as the Euroskepticals within the government as “strategic pygmies” (Sloam 2005: 142). 
                                                 
6 This issue became the subject of a big debate between Germany and France during the following years, with 
France willing to introduce a gouvernement économique to counterbalance the power of the independent ECB. 
7 This was one of the alternatives Ordoliberals had mentioned in order to achieve a stable EMU. 
8 Who eventually became German chancellor (1998-2005). 
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Since  these  elections  had  shown  that  voters  were  reassured  by  the  pact,  the  opposition 
responded by criticizing the economic performance of Germany and the unrealistic timetable 
that could not be carried out (Sloam 2005: 138). Additionally, they raised criticisms against 
the government on a more traditionally “social democratic” subject, namely the missing EU 
employment policy (Sloam 2005: 149). 
 
Their method of discussing EU integration as well as their exploitation of the matter for the 
national  elections  reveal  the  populist  appeal  of  the  issue.  As  mentioned  above,  parties, 
politicians, and the public feared the abandonment of the D-Mark, the heretofore driving 
force of German self-perception as a civilian and economic power. By repeating the criticism 
of  the  Bundesbank,  the  SPD  intended  to  gain  credibility  in  economic,  especially  fiscal, 
questions of the EMU. Secondly, the topic of monetary integration and the common currency 
were closely linked to the person of Helmut Kohl, who was seen as strongly attached to the 
European project. The government therefore could be criticized easily and effectively at the 
same time, as this topic touched important pillars of German national identity. Despite this 
attitude of the opposition, it should be kept in mind that there was at any time a general 
consensus among all parties regarding the importance of European integration and a stable 
common currency (Sloam 2005: 132). Contrary to what had been announced in 1995, the 
European policy became a minor issue in the upcoming national elections of 1998, a fact that 
also reveals that the SPD had abandoned its anti-EMU criticism. 
 
3.2.3  The government - Theo Waigel under pressure 
 
Due  to  the  nature  of  the  pact,  its  development  was  mainly  accorded  to  the  Minister  of 
Finance, Theo Waigel; an important switch of competencies had thus taken place. As the 
linking element between the national and European level, he faced several difficulties. First, 
he had to reassure the European partners fearing a German hegemony in the EMU (since, 
after all, the design of the independent ECB and the Maastricht criteria clearly reflected the 
ideologies of German monetary policy). Secondly, internal party disputes, the open criticism 
coming from the opposition, as well as the worsening public opinion of the Euro put him 
under pressure to act. Our research question places the emphasis of our evaluation clearly on 
actors in the domestic arena; nonetheless, this general situation has to be kept in mind when 
observing Waigel’s behavior.   22 
3.2.3.1 Internal party skepticism: Edmund Stoiber and the CSU 
 
In September 1993, the first negative critiques of EMU and its organization arose within 
Waigel‘s own party, the CSU: due to the experiences of the ERM crisis that had lasted until 
summer 1993 and fearing a shift towards the extreme-right in the upcoming elections, D-
Mark patriotism was a topic that seemed highly exploitable. Anticipating this, the Bavarian 
Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber wrote a letter to Kohl in which he proposed delaying entry to 
stage two until June 1994, when elections to the European parliament would have taken place 
(Dyson 2002: 198). Furthermore, the rivalries between the CSU party leader Waigel and 
Prime Minister Stoiber increased during the ensuing months: in 1995, both were candidates 
for the prime minister post (the more prestigious one) as well as for the chairman’s position. 
Especially for the latter, the anti-EMU sentiments were pushed by Stoiber (FAZ, 4.11.1995), 
whereas  during  the  prime  minister  elections,  a  more  domestically  oriented  campaign 
denouncing Waigel’s credibility and honorableness had been run
9. Politically weakened by 
these rivalries and facing increasing Euroskeptical attacks from the prime minister, Waigel 
had to react. 
  
3.2.3.2 EMU as a German responsibility: Helmut Kohl and the CDU 
 
In  addition  to  the  pressure  from  his  own  party,  Waigel  was  also  constrained  by  Kohl’s 
statements  at  the  IGCs  and  to  the  German  public.  The  chancellor  refused  to  delay  the 
timetable because of the “special responsibility“ he believed Germany had for the EMU: a 
symbolic  gesture  that  would  show  the  German  desire  to  make  European  integration 
irreversible, deriving from Germany’s self-perception as the driving force of the European 
Union and its leadership role on monetary integration. Nevertheless, Kohl insisted on strict 
compliance  with  the  criteria  and  made  clear  that  Germany  was  not  willing  to  make  any 
compromises  concerning  stability  and  convergence  (German  News,  7.12.1995).  One 
important reason for this stance surely stems from the difficulties that Kohl faced during 
ratification  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  Germany.  The  narrow  majority  within  the  two 
chambers and the constitutional complaint that had been lodged against the Treaty generated 
high domestic political costs (Rhodes/Mazey 1995: 259).  
 
                                                 
9 Comparable to the actual situation in Bavaria, the illegitimate relationship of Waigel was denounced intolerable 
for a future representative.   23 
While the influence of the Bundesbank had grown ever larger during European negotiations 
(see chap.3.1), Kohl also needed to convince his domestic partners to commit to the common 
project by making credible promises.  For example, his Secretary of Finance at the time, 
Jürgen Stark, stressed that the introduction of the euro was clearly not a currency reform as it 
had no consequences for the real values, but was rather simply a technical process (Waigel 
1996: 288). He thereby proclaimed the introduction of the common currency as a simple 
exchange of one banknote by another. Theo Waigel, on the other side, repeated incessantly 
that the Euro would be “at least as stable as the D-Mark” (Dyson 2002: 196). Indeed, this was 
also the title of an information brochure edited by the Finance Ministry on the EMU. 
 
As the third stage of the Delors-Report was planned to start in 1997 and to last until 1999, 
another problem aggravated the situation: after having fought for strict convergence by all 
Member States, Germany was no longer completely sure if it would be able to reach the 3% 
ceiling negotiated in Maastricht. Waigel’s statement that “3 percent means three point zero 
percent” (Ahrens/Ohr 2003: 57) now hung like a sword of Damocles over him: making a 
public pledge to guarantee price stability as well as Germany’s economic (and thus political) 
credibility seemed insufficient; an institutional framework was needed. 1997 had been fixed 
as  a  reference  year  for  measuring  the  achievement  of  the  deficit  criteria  within  the  EU-
countries, and in late 1995, time was running out - there was need for action. However, this 
did  not  necessarily  require  a  strict  set  of  mandatory  rules,  as  the  SGP  would  later  be 
perceived. As originally intended, the primary objective of the pact was to calm the German 
public,  though  it  also  clearly  spelled  out  the  German  position  for  the  upcoming  IGCs 
regarding  the  so-called  “Maastricht  leftovers”  (Sloam  2005:  133)  and  put  pressure  on 
domestic politics concerning the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. Additionally, the 
future accession countries (negotiations had already started), which had traditionally rather 
weak economies, had to be bound to the stability values on a long-term basis. In particular, 
Germany  feared  the  free-riding  of  certain  countries,  which  would  seriously  endanger  the 
euro’s credibility (Ahrens/Ohr 2003: 59). 
 
3.2.3.3 The Federal Ministry of Finance - birthplace of the SGP 
 
Shortly after his re-election as leader of the CSU, Theo Waigel announced at the German 
Bundestag his initial proposals on how to guarantee a generally sound fiscal policy within the 
Eurozone. Immediately, a working group within the Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) was   24 
set  up:  it  consisted  of  four  members,  two  from  the  Grundsatzabteilung  (Department  of 
Financial  Policy)  and  two  from  the  subdivision  for  European  issues  (Department  for 
International  Affairs).  Only  one  month  later,  in  November  1995,  the  FMF  presented  a 
working paper titled “Stability Pact for Europe,” declared as a starting point for a common 
European position paper. It defined the maximum deficit ceiling at 3% and made clear that in 
times of economic growth, this shall be reduced by as much as 1% - thus, the 3% limit was 
not to be exceeded even in times of recession. In case of a breach of the rule, an automatic 
mechanism of sanctions would be set in motion, allowing exceptions of this mechanism in 
case of difficult economic situations. In addition to the convergence criteria, it foresaw a 
“stability council” (now called Eurogroup), consisting of the national ministers of economy 
and finance, to supervise the coordination of the fiscal policies and to work as an advisory 
body  for  Member  States  and  the  EcoFin  conferences  (FES  1997:  110).  Even  though  the 
proposal was frequently criticized by the European partners in the following months, the 
domestic political controversies decreased. 
 
3.2.4  Conclusion 
 
The debate amongst the political parties concerning the SGP was relatively short. It began in 
late 1992 with the difficult ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty in Germany and 
France and was aggravated by the ERM crisis in 1992, which culminated in the de facto 
collapse  of  the  ERM  system  in  1993  (Ahrens/Ohr  2003:  62).  With  the  presentation  of 
Waigel’s paper in November 1995, a general cross-party consensus regarding the question of 
how  to  continue  toward  EMU  had  been  reached.  Even  if  there  was  a  sound  economic 
argument for the SGP which derived from the European level (i.e. to guarantee a long-term 
fiscal discipline of the Euro-countries), the main impetus for the pact was a domestic political 
pressure: the annual budget debate was in full swing and the opposition parties would surely 
point out the flagging economic performance of Germany. The domestic pressure aspect can 
also be seen in the conception of the pact as it was perceived during its elaboration: it was by 
no means intended to be a strict set of rules, but rather as a means of reassuring the public. 
Consequently, the sanctions were not introduced with the intention of actually being applied 
(the exceptional arrangements mentioned above reveal this), but rather as a mechanism of 
deterrence.  Nonetheless,  this  never  challenged  the  common  perception  of  the  SGP  as  an 
important political arrangement that necessarily should accompany the economic integration. 
Generally, it was primarily due to Waigel’s political abilities and his quick reaction that the   25 
SGP could convince the political parties to commit to the uncontested common goal: the 
introduction  of  a  stable,  credible  euro.  As  mentioned  above,  the  domestic  discussion  in 
Germany was mainly concerned with the question of which was more important: respecting a 
firm timetable or favoring the strict convergence (Dyson 2002: 192). 
 
In  the  agenda-theoretic  context,  the  political  parties  play  an  important  role,  in  that  they 
provide ideologies upon which voters may rely. Chancellor Kohl’s symbolic self-perception 
as  an  architect  of  the  “European  house”  (Sloam  2005:  139)  surely  contributed  to  the 
credibility  of  the  government’s  performance  in  economic  policies.  By  establishing  the 
concept of the SGP, in close cooperation with the Bundesbank, Germany’s culture of stability 
seemed to be safeguarded, and the Euroskeptic wing of the party-coalition (notably Stoiber) 
was reassured by this political accompaniment to the EMU. The voters were also newly 
bound - in an ideological dimension - to the European project of the government. Therefore, 
the criticism coming from the opposition parties as well as the escalating threat posed by the 
growing success of the extreme-right parties could be absorbed. The former’s attempts at 
repeating the Bundesbank’s arguments in order to wear the mantel of populist appeal and 
thereby win additional votes was thwarted by the party’s inner disunity on the topic of how to 
successfully  implement  the  EMU.  This  was  further  reflected  in  its  ideological  problems: 
there were no clear, unanimous statements from the SPD in the media regarding the SGP. 
Some experts saw this as a major reason for the considerable defeats of the SPD in the 
regional elections in early 1996 (Notermans 2001: 90). Nevertheless, it is to the merit of the 
SPD  that  the  missing  “stability  organ”  was  put  on  the  agenda  of  the  domestic  political 
discussion in the first place.  
 
3.3  Academics 
 
When trying to explain the ideas and ideologies existing in Germany before and during the 
negotiations of the Stability and Growth Pact, one has to focus on those who formed the 
relevant actors’ orientations. Experts like scholars and academics shape ideas, they do not 
make decisions – and they are therefore constitutive in influencing the public opinion and the 
policy makers. 
 
The SGP was primarily a politically motivated pact and German academics did not have a say 
in the negotiations. Nevertheless, the academics contributed to the public debate – they seem   26 
to have been quite present in the German public and German media. The German Council of 
Economic  Advisors  (Sachverständigenrat  zur  Begutachtung  der  gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung), an academic body which advises the German government and Parliament on 
economic  policy  issues,  publishes  an  annual  report  on  current  issues  which  is  generally 
perceived as leading the economic discourse in Germany, and thus it receives effective media 
attention each  year.  The German Council of  Economic Advisors is dealt with here as  an 
institutional  representative  of  official  economic  think-tanks  in  Germany  (other  important 
institutions  like  the  German  Institute  of  Economic  Research  (DIW)  and  special  advisory 
boards of the German Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics followed a similar 
approach).  Furthermore,  in  addition  to  individually  published  papers,  speeches,  and 
statements which are neglected here, several manifestos of German economists expressing 
their passionate views on the SGP were published in well-known and popular newspapers like 
the Handelsblatt or the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) during the 1990s. We will 
focus on two opposing manifestos: the manifesto of the Group of Sixty from June 11
th, 1992 
in the FAZ, which argued against the SGP and its counter-manifesto three days later. 
 
The German political economy was respected abroad and served as a guarantee for stability 
and self-confidence domestically, which was of great importance for the country’s particular 
identity.  Germany’s  economic  ideas  on  the  efficient  and  long-term  functioning  of  a 
competitive market in combination with its strong independent Bundesbank committed to low 
inflation  and  price  stability  served  as  a  role  model  in  Europe  that  paved  the  way  to  an 
Economic and Monetary Union (Dyson/Padgett 2005: 5). 
 
The German tradition of a Central Bank independent of political pressure to assure economic 
stability was at the heart of German ordoliberalism. As a consequence, German academics in 
general favored strict rules of convergence and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy 
on a large scale. But opinions differed on how and when to institutionalize a control organ and 
if the SGP was the right means to do so.  
 
3.3.1  The German Council of Economic Advisors 
 
The  German  Council  of  Economic  Advisors,  the  most  influential  economic  authority  in 
Germany, argued in its annual reports in 1995 and 1996 that an effective stability pact is 
indispensable for economic reasons and for increasing the acceptance of EMU in public. The   27 
Council promoted the compliance of strict convergence criteria to ensure development and 
growth of the European economies, to set the preconditions for a stable monetary value and to 
avoid the burden of excessive deficits on the public budgets. (Sachverständigenrat 1996: 219). 
 
Although the Council was thoroughly pro-stability pact, it viewed the SGP as insufficient and 
inadequate to ensure the functional efficiency of EMU. To guarantee a credible mechanism of 
sanctions, the Council argued for a budgetary pact (Haushaltspolitischer Pakt) in 1995 which 
would go beyond the designated measures of the SGP. In addition to the 3 percent criteria and 
the non-interest-bearing deposit at the European Central Bank in case of violation, extensive 
automatic  sanctions  intervening  with  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Member  States  were 
recommended. The Council suggested prompting the Member States to include a public credit 
limitation in their constitutions which would safeguard the compliance  of the Maastricht-
criteria concerning the deficit quota and the debt level (Sachverständigenrat 1995: 255).  
 
As  expected,  the  Council’s  proposals  were  refused  as  being  too  far-reaching  and 
unenforceable; the Member States would have never agreed to such a pact. In the Council’s 
annual  report  one  year  later,  in  1996,  the  Council  had  already  discarded  the  option  of  a 
budgetary pact and focused on the SGP, which by then  was quite obviously  going to be 
implemented one year later.  
 
The Council then underlined the importance of strict convergence criteria without exceptions 
and recommended a postponement of the pact in the following scenarios: 
-  not enough countries adhere to the debt level and excessive deficit criteria by spring 
1998; 
-  the Member States cannot agree on an appropriate definition of when sanctions set in; 
-  the  mechanism  for  sanctions  leaves  too  much  room  for  interpretation,  so  that  the 
stability of EMU would be endangered. (Sachverständigenrat 1996: 214-215) 
 
The argument for securing monetary stability at any cost reflects the ordoliberal character of 
the academic discussion at that time. Although the German government agreed with the main 
points of the German Council of Economic Advisors, it was not economically, but primarily 
politically, motivated to push through the SGP. A postponement of the pact would have made 
it  impossible  to  remain  credible  to  the  German  public  and  to  not  scare  off  the  financial 
markets, and Theo Waigel remained true to his principles of strict compliance with the three   28 
percent criteria as well as the absolute refusal of new negotiations and/or postponement of the 
SGP (Hanke/Wernicke 1997). To sum up, the German Council of Economic Advisors feared 
the divergence of monetary policy and fiscal and economic policy by the Member Sates and 
was skeptical about the inadequate consideration of economic needs in the pact. In the end, 
the German Council of Economic Advisors played an important role in shaping the public 
academic opinion, but its recommendations remained unheard and ultimately not crucial in 
the decision-making process of the SGP. 
 
3.3.2  Pro and contra Stability and Growth Pact 
 
Due to the broad common background of ordoliberal ideas, economists in Germany were 
opposing one another only with regard to the discussion about when and how to implement 
EMU and the SGP, and not about whether to implement it at all. Since the SGP is part of 
EMU and cannot be separated from it adequately, this chapter deals with the pros and cons of 
SGP and EMU. Below are the main statements and manifestos in the 1990s: 
 
Statements against Maastricht 
-  Manifesto of 60 economists against EMU; published on June 11
th 1992 in the FAZ 
-  The Euro-lawsuit. Four professors take legal action against EMU and SGP: Wilhelm 
Hankel, Wilhelm Nölling, Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider and Joachim Starbatty; 
published on January 12
th, 1998 in the Handelsblatt 
-  Manifesto of 150 economists against the early implementation of the Euro, led by the 
Professors Wim Kösters, Manfred Neumann, Renate Ohr and Roland Vaubel; 
published on February 9
th, 1998 in the FAZ 
 
Statements pro Maastricht 
-  Response to the Manifesto of 60 economists against EMU by the chief economists of 
the major banks: Ernst Moritz Lipp, Dresdner Bank, Ulrich Ramm, Commerzbank, 
Norbert Walter, Deutsche Bank with their counter-arguments; published on June 15
th, 
1992 
-  Response to the Manifesto of 60 economists against EMU by European economists, 
pro-EMU; published on July 8
th, 1992 
-  Manifesto by more than 50 economists: Plea for the Euro – 10 points to counter Euro-
skepticism; published in September 1997 in the Manager-Magazin   29 
 
3.3.3  Manifesto of 60 economists against EMU and the response of chief economists 
 
The two main opposing manifestos will be dealt with now in more detail. On June 11
th, 1992, 
sixty German economists published a manifesto in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 
which they criticized in eleven statements why the steps towards EMU have been taken too 
early and are not sufficient. One of the signers was Roland Vaubel, professor of economics at 
the University of Mannheim, who promoted “thoroughness before rapidity” (Vaubel 2001: 
63) and opposed the process towards EMU and SGP. Vaubel would later argue that between 
1988 and 1998, the majority of the German citizens were against EMU, but the Bundestag 
nevertheless voted for EMU in 1993 and 1998. Claiming an insurmountable gap between 
Europe’s politics and the European citizens’ will, especially during the negotiations towards 
EMU, one can grasp his and other economists’ frustrations over their lack of impact on the 
decision-making process (Vaubel 2001: 115).  
 
On June 15
th, 1992, only three days later, the chief economists of Germany’s major banks, 
Ernst  Moritz  Lipp  (Dresdner  Bank),  Ulrich  Ramm  (Commerzbank)  and  Norbert  Walter 
(Deutsche Bank) responded to the Manifesto of 60, trying to disprove each of the eleven 
arguments and to generate pro-EMU counterarguments. They complained that the Group of 
Sixty’s statements endangered Europe’s institutional design and the process of integration in 
Europe. By coming out as absolutely pro-European, they tried to counteract the impression 
that most German economists were against EMU and SGP.  
 
Below,  each  of  the  eleven  statements  is  set  in  contrast  with  the  corresponding  counter-
argument of EMU’s advocates (Bofinger/Collignon/Lipp 1993: 233-234):  
 
 
  Group of Sixty:  
Arguments against EMU 
 
Chief economists of major banks:  
Counter-arguments pro EMU 
1.  An economic and monetary union is a desirable 
aim for the European integration process. 
However, the Maastricht decisions are unsuitable 
for doing so. 
An economic and monetary union is not only a 
“desirable aim,” but rather the consistent 
completion of the European Single Market. 
2.  A functioning economic and monetary union 
requires the long-lasting and proven convergence 
of relevant economic structures of the Member 
States. A one-time compliance at a reference date 
does not give evidence if a country will be able to 
fulfill the convergence criteria in the long run.  
Convergence has been in process – statistically 
verifiable – for many years, and the adjustment of 
the Member States’ economic structures is at the 
heart of the agreement. Furthermore, the Member 
States committed to present perennial convergence 
programs (which has already been carried out by   30 
six countries, among them Germany).  
3.  The Maastricht convergence criteria are not 
binding enough. As an economic precondition, 
price stability has to be defined in absolute terms. 
The convergence criteria are rigorous indeed. The 
criterion of 60 percent for the public debt gives 
even stability-oriented countries like Belgium and 
Ireland a hard time to comply. If one calls for 
absolute price stability, this should already be 
demanded of the Bundesbank now, which is 
unrealistic for Germany and Europe. 
4.  By fixing the date of the implementation of EMU 
to January 1
st, 1999, political decisions will 
weaken the agreed convergence criteria: In 
particular, the inflation and deficit criteria will be 
softened so as not to discriminate against single 
countries. 
This statement is a reproach to the Treaty of 
Maastricht, implying that the stability-oriented 
German economic politics will be softened and not 
followed anymore. Softening the convergence 
criteria would breach the Treaty of Maastricht and 
will not be considered. 
5.  The European Central Bank will not achieve price 
stability, even if independent, since diverging 
interests of national decision-makers preclude a 
strong incentive to do so. There are no sanctions if 
price stability is disobeyed. 
An institutional independent European Central 
Bank has the incentive to guarantee stability since 
there have been strategies to fight inflation even in 
weak currency countries since the 1980s. The 
statute of the European Central Bank provides for 
the priority of price stability and the institutional, 
operational and personal independence of the 
executive committee. 
6.  To achieve price stability, the European Central 
Bank must be endowed with the competence to 
assign exchange rates towards third countries. 
Otherwise, there is the danger that the stability of 
monetary policy will be negatively affected due to 
lobbying over the exchange rates.  
It is true that the policies of price stability have to 
be supported by the European Central Bank’s 
competence to decide over exchange rates towards 
third countries. The Maastricht Treaty explicitly 
ensures that monetary value stability takes 
precedence over the decisions made by the 
Council of Ministers on exchange rates.  
7.  A consensus on price stability as the top priority, 
as it has traditionally been in Germany, has not 
been reached in all of Europe.  
This argument might have been true in the early 
1980s, but is not valid any more. A consensus on 
price stability has already been reached in 
Germany, France, Ireland, Denmark and the 
Benelux-Countries; other states are on the right 
track to follow a policy of price stability. 
8.  The economically weaker European countries will 
suffer from increasing competition in EMU. Their 
weaker productivity and competitiveness will lead 
to increasing unemployment. Thus, high transfer 
payments will be inevitable.  
The argument that EMU will lead to a cutthroat 
competition for weaker European countries would 
only be valid if all European Community Member 
States had to participate in EMU ab initio. 
Member states have to qualify to enter EMU by 
complying with the Maastricht criteria. 
9.  Pushing through a monetary union in an 
economically and socially diverse Europe cannot 
be economically justified. The realization of a 
European Single Market does not necessarily 
involve a common European currency. 
The Member States themselves decide whether to 
enter EMU or not; it is not a top-down procedure. 
10.  The hasty implementation of EMU will lead to 
serious tensions within western Europe and will 
jeopardize the integration process. 
The achieved convergence processes not only 
prove this argument wrong, but a reference date 
puts positive pressure on the Member States to 
fulfill the criteria. 
11.  The Maastricht decisions, not the criticism of 
them, put Europe’s integration at great risk.  
European integration has to advance and become 
successful right now – the perpetuation of the 
status quo is not an alternative. 
 
 
Retrospectively, one can say that much of the misgivings concerning EMU and the SGP have 
come true later on – countries were allowed to enter EMU without complying with the 60   31 
percent criterion and many countries breached the 3 percent criterion many years in a row, 
such as Germany from 2002 to 2005. Sanctions were not imposed on Germany: the Council 
of Ministers did not follow the recommendations of the European Commission for political 
reasons. The SGP was discredited as being an ineffective political instrument. On the other 
hand, the Euro has become a stable and reliable currency, the European Central Bank follows 
a stability-oriented and worldwide accepted monetary policy, and the SGP actively prevented 
free-riding and overly excessive deficits. 
  
3.3.4  Conclusion 
 
Economic institutions like the German Council of Economic Advisors supported a Stability 
and  Growth  Pact,  but  feared  that  economic  needs  were  inadequately  considered.  The 
Council’s approach was rather cautious; it favored a substantiated economic groundwork to 
eliminate all risk of failure and pleaded for a policy of price stability oriented on the German 
model,  based  on  German  ordoliberalism.  In  its  annual  report  in  2001,  the  Council 
acknowledged the achievements of the stability-oriented policy of the European Central Bank. 
Although the ECB was criticized for being too ambitious for setting its target at less than two 
percent, the Council stated that stable monetary conditions are a prerequisite for sustainable 
economic growth and that the ECB carried on its stable monetary policy in an environment 
affected  by  many  uncertainties.  Per  the  Council,  the  ECB  was  able  to  strengthen  its 
credibility, to stabilize the inflation expectations at a low level, and therefore to contribute to 
dynamic economic growth (Sachverständigenrat 2001: 19). 
 
Academics  in  Germany  were  split  into  several  camps.  German  economists  convened  to 
publish manifestos before the eyes of the public. The Manifesto of the Group of Sixty argued 
that EMU required a longer process of adjustment, that the convergence criteria were not 
binding enough, that the European Central Bank would be influenced by national interests, 
and that there was no consensus concerning price stability among the Member States. Staking 
out the opposing view, the chief economists of Germany’s major banks published a response 
to this manifesto and countered that EMU was a motor for European integration, that the 
convergence criteria were binding enough, that the European Central Bank would be even 
more independent than the Bundesbank, and that the policy of price stability was followed by 
all Member States, documented through the experience of the last decades.  
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One can conclude that the prevailing opinion was positive about European unity, but many 
academics  as  well  as  the  German  public  were  skeptical  about  the  decisions  made  in 
Maastricht. Per Vaubel, this was due to the fact that the citizens’ and academics’ influence 
and impact on the political decision-making process was minimal (Vaubel 2001: 114-115).  
 
Using  a  domestic  politics  approach,  academics  are  able  to  influence  the  agenda  building 
process, meaning the attempt to get certain issues and their interpretation into the media and 
therefore make them publicly available. The manifestos as well as the annual reports of the 
German Council of Economic Advisors can be interpreted as such an attempt. It is the only 
channel  with  which  academics  can  influence  the  decision-making  process  –  the  media 
consequently set the agenda. Academics shape ideas – and are important actors to influence 
the public opinion and politics (Heise 2005: 8-9). Before and during the negotiations of the 
SGP, the interests of the citizens as well as the academics were overridden by pure political 
interests (Vaubel 2001: 115). Therefore, academics contributed to the public debate, but were 
unable to influence the political decision-making process. 
 
3.4  German trade unions and employer associations 
 
The last actors which we will discuss in this chapter are German trade unions and German 
employer associations. Additional business interest groups will also be mentioned during the 
analysis. Not only is it worthwhile to highlight whether these actors were able to influence 
their members, but it is also important to determine whether they had any affect on public 
opinion and whether they were able to influence the political parties or the government. 
 
3.4.1  Trade unions 
 
In  examining  the  role  of  the  German  trade  unions,  statements  from  the  largest  umbrella 
association  of  German  trade  unions,  the  Deutscher  Gewerkschaftsbund  (DGB),  will  be 
analyzed. The DGB was fully in favor of EMU from the beginning, even though a monetary 
union would lead to higher pressures to reduce the relatively large German social benefits. 
Through its support for EMU, the DGB hoped to achieve a better coordination of employment 
and tariff policies on the European level. Moreover, it criticized the stability-oriented view of 
the German Bundesbank and supported a more employment-oriented approach (DGB 1995). 
As the German industry is primarily export-oriented, the fixing of exchange rates and the   33 
consequential adoption of a common currency throughout Europe would also be beneficial for 
the  German  labor  market.  This  was  the  first  of  five  theses  that  the  DGB  presented  in  a 
position paper in May 1997, approximately one month prior to the summit of Amsterdam 
(June  1997).  The  second  thesis  stated  that  the  EMU  would  lead  to  higher  prosperity 
throughout the EU. But, in its third thesis, the DGB put forward a request for compensation 
for the resulting reduction in the scope of national maneuvering with regard to economic 
policy. Thesis four was contrary to the view of the Bundesbank, stating that compliance with 
the Maastricht criteria should not be the most important factor when entering into stage three 
of EMU, because the rigid budgetary policy that would be required to meet the criteria would 
lead to an economic downturn and thus to higher unemployment rates. In its final thesis, the 
DGB clarified that EMU would not implicitly lead to higher employment rates in Europe. 
Therefore, it insisted upon the inclusion of an explicit employment policy in the Treaty (DGB 
1997b).  Furthermore,  the  DGB  asked  the  government  to  assure  that  there  would  be  no 
additional reductions concerning social policy and no further cutbacks of public investment 
(DGB 1997a).  
 
German trade unions, especially the DGB, tried to further develop a European Social Policy 
and a European Employment Policy. The DGB’s largest success in this field came via the 
Luxemburg,  Cardiff  and  Cologne  Processes
10.  At  the  Luxemburg  Summit  in  1997,  the 
coordination of labor market policies was agreed upon, while at the Cardiff Summit in 1998, 
the Member States’ governments decided to support the liberalization of the financial markets 
in order to enhance the structural change of the European economies in terms of knowledge 
and education. The Cologne Summit in 1999 then introduced a new term called “EU macro-
dialogue”. The Cologne Process “recognize[d] that a favorable macroeconomic situation is 
the prerequisite for lasting improvements in growth and employment, and that coordination of 
budgetary, monetary and incomes policy (…) [was] therefore desirable” (Heise 2002: 89). In 
this dialogue – for the first time – social partners, meaning mainly the trade unions, would be 
bound together in a process at the European level in which the European Central Bank’s 
activities had been set in a framework of employment policy (Heise 2002: 89).  
  
By analyzing these statements, one can conclude, even if the DGB did not openly mention the 
SGP, that the trade union was in favor of EMU overall, though not necessarily of the SGP, as 
                                                 
10 A detailed description of the developments and enhancements through these summits can be found in Heise 
2001 and Heise 2002.   34 
it  criticized  the  Bundesbank  for  its  stability-oriented  rather  than  employment-oriented 
approach.  
 
3.4.2  Employer associations and business interest groups 
 
In examining the employer associations, statements of the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Industrie (BDI – Federation of German Industry), of the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände  (BDA  –  Confederation  of  German  Employer)  and  of  the  Deutscher 
Industrie-  und  Handelskammertag  (DIHT  –  umbrella  association  of  the  chambers  of 
commerce and industry) will be analyzed. By naming those organizations, one can see that 
not only employer associations but also business interest groups are considered here. As they 
often took the same positions regarding EMU and the SGP, both types of groups will be 
analyzed together here. 
 
All three of the organizations mentioned above were in favor of creating a monetary union, 
but they all stipulated that such a union would have to be stability-oriented. Moreover, the 
BDI stated that such a stability-oriented monetary union would push forward the support for 
European integration and for a political union. In 1990, the DIHT and the BDI affirmed the 
Bundesbank’s statement and again claimed the need for a political union which they argued 
should be federally and decentrally organized. Later on, as an elementary precondition for the 
integration of the currencies, all three organizations came out in favor of strict compliance by 
all Member States with the Maastricht criteria and parroted the Bundesbank’s approach that 
compliance with the convergence criteria should be of the utmost importance, more so than 
strictly adhering to the schedule (Wendt 2002: 298-300). In 1995, the BDI postulated the need 
of framework conditions for the protection of price stability and consequently supported the 
idea of establishing some kind of sanctioning mechanism to deal with those states that were 
not in compliance with the convergence criteria (BDI 1995).  
 
3.4.3  Conclusion 
 
By  analyzing  the  DGB’s  statements,  one  can  readily  conclude  that  it  supported  EMU.  
However, although it did not openly mention the SGP, it is clear that they held reservations 
regarding  the  pact.    This  is  especially  evident  in  its  criticism  of  the  Bundesbank  for  its   35 
stability-oriented, rather than employment-oriented, approach. Employment orientation was, 
and of course remains, the main concern of the trade unions. 
 
The  employer  associations  and  the  business  interest  groups  were  of  a  different  opinion. 
Overall,  they  were  in  favor  of  EMU  and  were  clear  proponents  of  the  Bundesbank’s 
orientation  toward  stability.    They  demanded  strict  compliance  with  the  Maastricht 
convergence criteria by all Member States when entering into stage three of EMU. 
 
Viewing both “parties” as lobbies within the framework of the Agenda Theory, one must 
analyze their impact and influence upon the process of policy agenda building. In this process, 
voters try, via the help of lobbies, to let their opinion be known to the political parties. As the 
analysis above indicates, the influence of the lobbying parties was not particularly large. The 
DGB’s claim for a greater emphasis on employment-oriented policies was only pursued long 
after EMU and the SGP came into force. The Cologne Process can be seen as a gain for the 
DGB, but the question of to what extent it shaped the political parties’ opinions can not be 
answered. Oskar Lafontaine, German Finance Minister from 1998 to 1999, was perhaps the 
strongest  advocate  of  the  EU  macro-dialogue.  But  with  his  resignation,  the  window  of 
opportunity was closed (Heise 2001: 391). As for the employer associations and business 
interest groups, their influence on EMU and the SGP are often described as “piggybacking on 
the Bundesbank” (Heisenberg 2005: 98), meaning that they often took the same position as 
the most recent Bundesbank declaration. One can therefore conclude that their influence on 
the political parties was not particularly strong.   
 
4  Public opinion 
 
Public opinion plays an important role within the agenda theory, since it is the voting public 
that  influences  political  parties  through  the  policy  agenda  building  process.    Indeed,  the 
electorate provides the parties with the mandate they need to enact their agendas, and without 
pre-existing public support for their proposals, elected officials are faced with the challenge of 
convincing  a  skeptical  electorate  and  media  of  the  virtue  and  necessity  of  their  plan  or 
abandoning it and pursuing a new agenda.  The final alternative would of course be to get 
voted out of office, a prospect no respectable party member is likely to opt for.   
 
 
   36 
Figure 4.1     
(Source: Eurobarometers 25-49)   
 
4.1  The rise of Euroskepticism 
 
In  West  Germany,  as  evidenced  by  Figure  4.1,  public  support  for  European  integration 
generally  hovered  between  60-70%  before  1990  (based  on  responses  to  the  question 
“Generally speaking, do you think that Germany’s membership in the European Community 
is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither bad nor good?”).  With the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the reunification of East and West Germany, a brief (and distinctly out of character) political 
euphoria enveloped the country, and polling data from 1990-91 show the German public’s 
enthusiasm for seemingly any political proposal that fostered integration or unification of any 
sort.  However, this enthusiasm was short-lived, and as it became clear that the opening of the 
Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War were not going to lead to political utopia, the large 
upward spike was soon followed by a sharp erosion of support for European integration.  
Indeed, from 1991-97, positive responses to the question of whether EC membership is a 
good  thing  for  Germany  dropped  thirty-four  percentage  points  in  the  West  and  fifty-six 
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The only consolation for supporters of the integration process was that the percentage of 
Germans  who  felt  EC  membership  is  bad  for  Germany  stayed  relatively  low  and  stable, 
between  10-20%,  as  most  of  the  former  supporters  only  dropped  into  the  “Neither/Nor” 
response category.  Nonetheless, the growth of negative sentiment, rather than a mere drop in 
positive  sentiment,  can  clearly  be  seen  in  Figure  4.2.    The  question  posed  was  “Taking 
everything into consideration, would you say that Germany has benefited or not from being a 
member  of  the  European  Community?”    Here,  one  can  clearly  see  the  reversal  of  public 
opinion from overwhelmingly positive in 1991 to mostly negative in both East and West 
Germany just five years later (European Commission). 
 
One possible explanation for this massive increase in Euro-skepticism in Germany is that as 
the dates for monetary and political integration drew ever closer, the German public began to 
pay more attention to the process.  The European Union became less an idyllic abstract notion 
and more a concrete reality with consequences that would affect ordinary German citizens.  
As public interest (and doubts) began to grow, media coverage followed suit, and the popular 
press found it much easier (and more profitable) to resort to Euro scaremongering than to 
write thorough, incisive articles on the pros and cons of integration.  This only reinforced   38 
public doubts and contributed further to the downward slide of support for the European 
Union within Germany.  
 
4.2  Waigel’s response 
 
It was against this backdrop that German Finance Minster Theo Waigel proposed the SGP in 
late 1995.  There were certainly economic justifications for such a pact; however the primary 
impetus for Waigel’s proposal was domestic political pressure.  Chancellor Helmut Kohl was 
under pressure from the opposition parties, in particular regarding federal budgetary issues.  
The  main  opposition  party  had  just  achieved  success  in  the  state  elections  in  Baden-
Württemberg  by  campaigning  on  an  anti-Euro  platform.    There  were  clear  signs  that  the 
German electorate was growing increasingly Euroskeptical (Kastrop/Heipertz 2007). 
 
Waigel’s proposal was essentially a political device designed to alleviate the German public’s 
fears of an unstable EMU.  Eurobarometer poll data from 1994-95 show that nearly 70% of 
the German public supported a European policy of monetary stability.  The SGP would assure 
the public that their currency would remain stable under EMU.  However, as it was originally 
conceived, the SGP was supposed to be a rather toothless pact.  To the public, it was to appear 
strong enough that it would placate a riled-up electorate, yet it was designed so as not to 
impose too large a constraint upon fiscal policy in Germany.  The means through which this 
toothless pact acquired its bite will be dealt with in the following chapter (Kastrop/Heipertz 
2007; European Commission). 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
 
In the aftermath of German reunification, public support in Germany for European integration 
reached  all-time  highs.    From  that  point  on,  however,  public  support  quickly  eroded  as 
skepticism over the benefits and fears of the disadvantages grew.  The SGP was designed to 
counter this precipitous drop in support by allaying fears that EMU would lead to economic 
instability within Germany.  According to Agenda Theory, this is a clear example of the 
voters  utilizing  their  policy  agenda  building  role  to  put  their  concerns  about  European 
integration on the political parties’ agendas.  As noted in Chapter 1, public opinion is also   39 
intrinsically connected to the media’s agenda setting role.  We will therefore examine this 
interplay as well as the overall role of the media in the next chapter. 
 
5  Media 
 
Having analyzed the majority of the actors who influenced the German position during the 
SGP negotiations, we turn now to the one remaining actor, who is involved in nearly every 
issue considered by the public: the media. Because they do not stand for a single opinion or 
policy preference, the motives of this actor are more difficult to pigeonhole than those of the 
previous actors we have examined. At the same time, they are subject to their own rules, due 
to the media competition that produces conditions like acceleration, entertainment, and news 
on demand (Meckel 2003: 278), which guide their economic aspirations. 
 
“Mass media became an integral part of the glasses through which we view reality- 
together with the mass media itself.” (Meyer 2001: 11) 
 
5.1  Media democracy 
 
Media Democracy, along with other terms such as Mediocracy or Audience Democracy, is a 
concept with which media and communication scientists have tried to describe the modified 
relation between politics and media. In order to analyze the evolution of the SGP in media 
democracies, the overarching goal of this paper, it is important to clarify the various meanings 
of the term.  
 
Media democracy basically refers to the form of political decision-making in which the mass 
media and their communication rules take over a crucial position within the political process. 
“Media democracy is not a community in which the media merely play a role comparable to 
the other actors. It is rather the colonization of the political system through the media system” 
(Meyer  2001:  242).  According  to  this  view,  the  process  would  be  completed  when  the 
media’s rules encroach upon the political system and eventually override that system’s rules. 
This process is already well underway, as indicated by the following three tendencies: the 
increasing Americanization of election campaigns, the personalization of political messages, 
and the professionalization of political communication.  
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The similar term ‘mediocracy’ goes even further, linguistically abolishing the “demos” from 
the previous term and thereby emphasizing the disempowerment of the real sovereigns, the 
citizens. This concept goes back to the studies of media scientist Thomas Meyer, who pins his 
hopes on civil society prevailing against the media powers through the democratic process. 
Furthermore, one could argue that the loss of the parties’ importance signifies simultaneously 
the  shrinking  importance  of  the  citizens,  changing  the  original  form  of  participative 
democracy into an “audience democracy” (Manin 1997: 218, “democratie du public”) – by 
rendering the citizens to the role of mere observers of the political debate in the media, no 
longer able to actively intervene. This new form of governance is mainly characterized by 
personality-driven political campaigns and the rise in the number of practitioners and the 
importance  of  political  spin  and  public  relations  over  substantive  communication  (Kriesi 
2003: 208).  
 
With the terms now defined and the media democracy criteria established, we return to the 
behavior of the various actors during the SGP negotiations in the mid-1990s. 
 
5.2  SGP negotiation 
5.2.1  Coverage during the SGP negotiations 
 
The awareness that the development of the EMU also occurred in the climate of a mediocracy 
provides the necessary sensitivity when observing the media’s statements during this period, 
as we will undertake below. The very first realization one makes when observing the media 
coverage  of  the  SGP  negotiations  during  the  defined  period  (1995-1997)  is  that  the 
overwhelming majority of the coverage deals broadly with the euro. Very rarely does one find 
media  coverage  specifically  concerning  the  impending  entry  into  the  third  stage  of  the 
economic and monetary union (EMU), which would be most relevant for our purposes. As 
this appears to be a common characteristic of the German press reporting on the subject, we 
will refer only to a small selection of the journals when talking about media in this chapter. 
Looking  into  the  extended  debate  over  the  European  integration  process  and  Germany’s 
difficult  position  therein,  we  examined  articles  from  the  following  newspapers,  which 
represent a wide area of the German political spectrum: Die Welt (conservative), Die Zeit 
(intellectual/liberal), Süddeutsche (critical/liberal) and the news magazine Spiegel (critical/ 
impartial). In addition, the German populist newspaper Bild (conservative, business-friendly) 
will be taken into consideration due to its large circulation, because of which it can not be   41 
disregarded. The restriction of the press research to one medium (print journalism) is a result 
of parameters like accessibility and comparability. Based mainly on this selection during the 
respective period, various observations (without universal validity) are summarized in order 
to achieve insight into the SGP coverage.  
 
Initially, the two opposing interests were stability versus economic interests (growth), as best 
exemplified by, on the one hand, Germany’s insistence that any replacement for the D-Mark 
would absolutely need to be just as stable and, on the other hand, the primary French interest 
of  raising  exports.  In  the  advanced  stages,  the  catchword  of  the  debates  was  “automated 
sanction mechanism”, proposed by the German Finance Minister and refused by the French 
one, who was anxious to protect his country’s political sovereignty when dealing with cases 
of a failure to fulfill deficit or new indebtedness criteria. Later, the media (and thereby the 
public) reduced the broad range of fiscal policy terms and interdependences into a personal 
battle between four, and even two, people: The ministers of economomic and financial affairs 
in  Germany  and  France,  Theo  Waigel  versus  Jean  Athuis  (later  Strauss-Kahn),  and  these 
countries’ heads of government, Helmut Kohl versus Jacques Chirac.  
 
"Chirac: Die Franzosen nennen ihn (Helmut Kohl) ‘Bulldozer’"(Bild, 05.05.1998). 
“For weeks, Paris and Bonn had argued with each other over the Stability Pact.  On 
Thursday, the emergency meeting of the finance ministers in Dublin turned into a sort 
of cultural struggle. (…)That the negotiations over the euro didn’t collapse was due 
only to the intervention of others, especially Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourgian 
Premier and Finance Minister. He worked for hours, massaging egos and finally 
proposing the compromise formula that Jacques and Helmut, the Tall One and the Fat 
One, sealed with a handshake the next day”. (Zeit, 20.12.1996, authors’ own 
translation) 
 
Additionally, it has to be mentioned that this kind of personification was supported by one of 
the key actors, Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Called the father of integration (first because of his 
engagement for the reunification), he made no secret of the fact that the realization of the 
EMU is also a personal project of his. Although the issues were not suited for heightening the 
opposition  parties’  profiles,  the  media  took  on  every  opportunity  where  this  might  be 
attempted. This attitude sharpened the pressure which the government already was subject to 
(as described in 3.2).  
 
“Nationales Thema entdeckt” , SPD: Währungsunion – Wahlkampfhit (Spiegel 
30.10.1995)   42 
“Und dann gute Nacht” The SPD leadership believes they’ve discovered a campaign 
hit: citizens’ fears of the new euro currency. (Spiegel, 06.11.1995, authors’ own 
translation) 
“Euro - die wichtigste Debatte im Bundestag”: Kohl wants to withstand all attacks, 
making the European unification “irreversible.” (Bild, 13.12.1996, authors’ own 
translation) 
 
Generally speaking, the tabloid Bild can be singled out for its rather pro-euro coverage. Due 
to the relatively objective approach of the other newspapers when referring to the EMU in 
news reports, a clear categorization of them as for or opposed to EMU cannot conclusively be 
made. However, the term media democracy can now be seen from a new perspective. By 
examining the random sample of newspaper reports, one can observe all three tendencies 
(Americanization, personalization and professionalization of political communication) during 
the SGP negotiations, one can see evidence of all three having taken place, though this paper 
will be primarily concerned with the personalization of the political actors (or conflict) and 
the professionalizing of political communication (which will be looked at in more detail in 
5.3.3.). 
 
5.2.2  Public opinion during SGP negotiations 
 
The initial mood of the public regarding the impending adoption of the euro in Germany was 
mainly one of anxiety. Germans feared that by discarding their strong D-Mark in favor of the 
common euro, they might potentially also be discarding the stability and prosperity that they 
had long associated with their currency. Their deep connection to the D-Mark can certainly be 
understood  and  even  justified;  after  the  losses  and  uncertainties  of  the  post-war  period 
(including the monetary uncertainties), the strong and growing German economy, based on a 
stable currency, had over the previous half-century become an integral part of the German 
identity.  The German adherence to the DM can be understood as a logical consequence of 
historical imprinting. In this context, the strong emotions fueled by the imminent arrival of the 
euro can be appreciated. Survey data show that in 1996, about 55 percent disapprove of the 
Euro while only 38 percent approve, whereas the European average lies around a 54 percent 
pro-Euro sentiment (Focus survey, 04.03.96). It is therefore by no means astonishing that 
there was a strong public outcry in the same year to hold a referendum upon the adoption of 
the euro, which suggests that people had taken some lessons with them from the (in their 
eyes) poorly executed reunification several years earlier (Focus survey, 30.12.96).    43 
 
Taking these figures, which demonstrate the generally negative attitude of Germany’s public 
opinion towards the euro, in combination with the findings of chapter four provides a basis 
from which one can further understand the public reception to the SGP’s development in 
particular. It is plainly evident that the main desire of the German public with regard to the 
new currency, namely a guarantee of continued stability, was in perfect compliance with the 
German government’s official position at the European level. It is interesting to note that this 
aspect of monetary policy was not only being discussed by bodies of experts, but also by 
ordinary citizens at all levels. According to experts’ statements
11, it was primarily the SGP 
that brought such issues out of the ivory towers and into the neighborhood pubs. 
 
5.3  Media and Agenda Theory 
5.3.1  Approach to the theory 
 
Originally  arising  out  of  scientific  communication  research,  the  Agenda  Theory  has  been 
expanded and modified within different disciplines to suit the particular needs of the field. For 
that  reason,  different  assumptions  regarding  the  functioning  of  the  actors  need  to  be 
understood. In this chapter, we have thus far analyzed the media’s role in the political process 
via a political-economic view of the theory. We will now briefly examine the precursors to 
the Agenda Theory from the point of view of the communications sciences, which is where 
they were originally conceived of and developed. 
 
The first assumption regarding the agenda effect and simultaneously the theoretical base for 
all further research on this matter was the thesis of Bernard C. Cohen (Cohen 1963: 13) who 
famously stated: “The mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they 
are stunningly successful in telling us what to think about.”  Hardly ten years later, Maxwell 
E. McCombs and Donald Shaw confirmed his thesis empirically. During the 1968 presidential 
elections in Chapel Hill (North Carolina, USA), they were able to demonstrate the agenda 
setting effect in an experiment known as the “Chapel Hill study.” Undecided voters were 
asked  to  outline  the  key  issues  of  the  election  as  they  perceived  them.  Researchers  also 
analyzed the issues that received the most print and airtime in the mass media. The nearly 
perfect correlation between the predominant issues on the media agenda and the public’s 
                                                 
11 Personal interview conducted by the authors with Christian Kastrop and Martin Heipertz, 11.01.2007.   44 
agenda led them to the conclusion that “while the mass media may have little influence on the 
direction or intensity of attitudes, it is hypothesized that the mass media set the agenda for 
each  political  campaign,  influencing  the  salience  of  attitudes  toward  the  political  issue” 
(McCombs/Shaw  1972:  177).  Since  then,  many  scientists  have  further  enhanced  these 
findings (amongst others McCombs/Shaw 1993) by focusing on different actors in the inter-
relation between policy, media and the public opinion – depending on the research field. One 
of  these,  which  deals  with  the  emergence  of  the  media’s  agenda,  is  the  agenda-building 
process. At present, the communication science research indicates that issues are intensified 
and settled in both processes, through the media via agenda setting and the parties via agenda 
building  (Nieland  2003:  134).  Both  processes  are  included  in  the  comprehensive  Agenda 
Theory, which, given the political science and economic leanings of its originators, expanded 
further to include policy agenda setting and policy agenda building functions. The interplay 
between  the  three  interrelated  actors  (media,  political  parties,  and  voters/lobbies),  as 
structured within three of these four agenda processes, will be considered in the following 
observations of the media’s role during the debate over the SGP in Germany.  (Policy agenda 
building, the fourth Agenda Theory process will not be covered in this chapter, as the media is 
not directly involved in this process.)   
 
5.3.2  Agenda-Setting 
 
The agenda is the instrument through which the media are able to exert the most influence 
over the public. Communicating certain political issues through the press or via broadcast as 
well as deciding the relative importance of the topics to be discussed gives the mass media 
access to the individual mind and particularly to the public mind, with the effect of shaping 
public opinion on (policy) preferences.  
 
“Das Ende der Mark?” Germans don’t want to accept it, but the common European 
currency is coming. (Spiegel, 11.07.1994, authors’ own translation) 
 
Regarding the development of the SGP, this process needs to be supported with political 
background information. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the emergence of the so-
called  Waigel  Plan  came  during  a  period  marked  by  Euroskepticism.  German  politicians 
responded  to  this  domestic  pressure  with  the  SGP.  Having  perceived  the  population’s 
sensitivity  to  the  loss  of  their  D-Mark,  they  responded  with  a  proposal  for  an   45 
intergovernmental  agreement,  complementary  to  the  Maastricht  criteria  and  calling  for 
common and mutually binding criteria, in order to secure a stable currency. Seeing the pact 
from this slightly exaggerated point of view as a mere public pacification measure transforms 
our perception of each article and television report into part of a political plan. Interviews 
with politicans, generally seen as being in the common public interest, could now be regarded 
as  mere  platforms  for  politicians  to  sound  off.  A  Spiegel  Interview  (30.12.1997)  with 
Wolfgang Schäuble, former head of CDU/CSU party in parliament, exemplifies this:  
 
(Sp)The chancellor and the finance minister consistently say that the euro will be just 
as stable as the D-Mark. Is it possible to keep this promise? (Sc) It is an observable 
fact: the average inflation rate for all EU Member States has been reduced well more 
than half since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.  The Stability Pact, which was 
approved in Dublin in mid-December after much debate and negotiation, markedly 
improves the chances for stability even further. (Sp) Citizens could decide to invest 
their savings in Swiss francs or the dollar or a similar currency in order to avoid the 
risk from the euro. (Sc) So far we’ve seen few signs of that. There’s a relatively large 
confidence in the stability of the European currency. (Authors’ own translation) 
 
When  politicians  make  their  political  statements  and  give  their  policy  opinions,  it  is  an 
indication that we have entered the policy agenda process (5.3.3.). Here the objective is the 
pacification of the public’s fears, for which the media is being used by the political actors. 
 
5.3.3  Policy agenda setting 
 
Policy agenda setting is not related to mass communication research on public agenda setting. 
However, Walter Lippmann, Bernard Cohen, Maxwell McCombs, Donald Shaw and Shanto 
Iyengar, forerunners of agenda setting, had turned their attention to policy agenda setting in 
addition to their research on the influential role played by the mass media (Dearing & Rogers 
1996).  This  theory  was  mainly  developed  by  political  scientists  and  sociologists.  Policy 
agenda setting presumes the media’s impact on political parties by informing them about 
public opinion and thereby positioning issues from the public and/or media agenda on to the 
policy  agenda.  (Dearing  and  Roger  identified  three  constituent  parts  of  this  process, 
distinguishing  between  media,  public,  and  policy  agendas.)  Consequently,  an  issue,  when 
placed on the policy agenda, eventually prompts the government to address or to solve a 
social problem. 
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Regarding the effect the media had on the behavior of political parties during the French-
German dispute over the SGP, various studies (mentioned in 5.2.2) commissioned by media 
companies  can  provide  a  first  approach  to  this  interplay.  Highlighting  and  consistently 
repeating the Germans’  fears  and refusal with respect to the new  currency  and the EMU 
generally was one commonly used approach.  
“Angst vor Populisten:” Almost no one in Bonn still believes that a common currency 
will be achieved in 1999, because the political and economic risks are too high. (…) 
Furthermore, Germans desire additional rules to ensure stable budget policies in all 
Member States. (Spiegel, 02.10.1995, authors’ own translation) 
 
The public’s demand for a referendum at the national level concerning the implementation of 
the euro made this impression even more apparent. The political actors took this attitude 
seriously and released the Waigel Plan as a measure to positively influence the voters. This 
plan eventually evolved into the SGP after years of debate. 
 
5.3.4  Agenda building 
 
Of  course  all  this  occurs  within  a  very  tight  interplay  which  makes  the  parties  involved 
mutually  dependent.  Hence,  it  is  consistent  that  political  actors  also  try  to  influence  the 
priority of the media’s agenda issues via public statements, broadcasted discussion groups or 
printed interviews in highly circulated journals. This is exactly what happened during the 
negotiations over the pact (compare also Spiegel, Schäuble Interview, 41/1996), though much 
more so after the SGP has already been established. 
 
“Theo hat alles gegeben”: Europe just took a step closer to a common currency: at 
their conference in Dublin, the heads of government agreed to a Stability Pact that, 
according to the Germans, is necessary in order to make the euro stable. (Spiegel, 
16.12.1996, authors’ own translation) 
"Euro  Die  Wunderdroge":  The  euro  is  effective  against  inflation,  against  budget 
deficits  and  also  against  unemployment?  Yes,  it  creates  one  monetary  and  one 
economic area from Lapland to Algarve, and the economic cycle booms everywhere- 
including  here.  Wonder-Euro,  Euro-Wonder.  (Bild,  27.02.98,  authors’  own 
translation) 
 
Additionally, opinion makers in this process attempted to support the proposal by making use 
of the media platform. 
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"Bundesbank: Niedrigstzinsen kein Hindernis für mehr Beschäftigung": Quotes by the 
German Central Bank president Hans Tietmeyer that extremely low interest rates do 
not contribute to unemployment, but to favorable investment conditions. “This is also 
an important contribution for a good start to the Euro.” (Bild, 19.02.97, authors’ own 
translation) 
 
This  procedure  has  particular  significance  during  election  campaigns,  where  the  topics, 
presented by candidates and their parties, are given more consideration than usual. Here, the 
media agenda becomes a political instrument with outstanding importance, affecting public 
opinion even more when the agenda-theoretical assumption that voters have only incomplete 
information is taken into account. During the negotiations over the criteria in the third stage of 
the EMU, this process could also be observed (see chapter 3.2). The SPD, the main opposition 
party, had just achieved success in the state elections in Baden-Württemberg by campaigning 
on an anti-Euro platform.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
The deeply interwoven relations between the relevant Agenda Theory actors (parties, media, 
and voters) help to explain the very causally determined outcomes. Summing up the processes 
that led to the establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact as viewed through the prism of 
the Agenda Theory, one can distinguish between two periods: (1) before Waigel’s proposal 
for a European stability pact in Dublin in late 1995 and (2) after this event.  
 
(1)  With  the  deadline  for  implementation  of  the  euro  drawing  ever  closer,  the  German 
public’s  fear  and  rejection  increased.  Rarely  perceptible  before  the  European  monetary 
integration, their apprehension of the threats posed by the adoption of a new currency placed 
the outcome of the entire integration process in doubt. The media responded to this fear by 
attending  to  its  duty  and  publicizing  the  issue.  The  intense  and  diverse  media  reports 
concerning this issue only served to reinforce the public awareness and skepticism (agenda-
setting). The domestic pressure on the government (see chapter 3.2. on political parties) was 
enforced through this public pressure, which in turn was communicated by the media (policy 
agenda setting). (2) Once Waigel made his proposal, it was then the policy agenda which 
influenced the media and thereby the public agenda. The message of the SGP’s effect as a 
currency-stabilizing measure had to be communicated to the public via the media (agenda-
building).   48 
 
Finally, we can integrate the role of the media into the pact’s development.  The general 
growth  of  the  media’s  importance  in  a  media  democracy  can  be  seen  first  by  its  role  in 
prompting Waigel to initially propose a stability pact for Europe.  Furthermore, it has been 
made quite clear that this proposal, which would become the Stability and Growth Pact, was 
well-received by the media and the public, which again reinforced and reaffirmed each other’s 
view, placing pressure on the government to push this pact through at the European level. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Returning to our initial research question, the following ideas, interests, and ideologies were 
identified during the creation and development of the Stability and Growth Pact in Germany: 
Germany’s principal ideas of monetary stability and the absolute adherence to the timetable 
for  the  entry  to  stage  three  of  EMU  heavily  biased  the  negotiation  process.    With  the 
establishment  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  the  Member  States  were  deprived  of  their 
sovereignty over monetary policy, while fiscal policy remained in the hands of the States and 
could therefore not be sufficiently controlled at the European level. Consequently, via the 
criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, Germany wanted to push through its interest in the 
stability-oriented  coordination  of  Member  States’  fiscal  policies.  Furthermore,  Germany 
wanted to ensure that excessive budgetary deficits and free-riding by poorer Member States 
would  be  avoided.  These  German  ideas  and  interests  were  shaped  by  two  underlying 
ideologies,  namely  D-Mark  patriotism  and  ordoliberalism.  The  historical  success  of  the 
German model resulted in Germany’s strong position during the negotiations on the SGP. 
Using  a  domestic  politics  approach,  Germany’s  dominating  role  can  be  explained  by  the 
ideas, ideologies and interests of domestic actors. This paper focused on the impact of the 
Bundesbank, the political parties, the academics, the trade unions and employers association, 
the  public  opinion  and  the  media  on  the  German  national  debate.  Below,  these  actors’ 
individual positions are summarized in light of the Agenda Theory.  
 
The German Bundesbank, long recognized as the guarantor of price stability, was the most 
important actor in the conceptualization period of the SGP, thanks in large part to its widely 
accepted credibility. Its influence on public opinion and its resultant informal veto position 
were factors that could not be ignored by the German government and the Federal Ministry of   49 
Finance. The political costs of a negative statement by the Bundesbank would have been 
extremely high, due to its elevated status in the public opinion. Therefore, the government 
decided to incorporate the bank as an advisor in the process of establishing and negotiating 
the SGP. In terms of the Agenda Theory, the Bundesbank influenced the media by stating the 
need  for  a  stability-oriented  fiscal  policy,  which  then  set  that  issue  on  the  agenda.  Hans 
Tietmeyer, in particular, was an influential representative of the Bundesbank, and his frequent 
interviews and statements to the media certainly influenced the public discussion. 
 
The political parties in Germany played an important role in providing ideologies for the 
voters on which they could rely on. Chancellor Helmut Kohl had tied the politics of his party 
(CDU) to the ideal of European integration in pushing forward EMU. In close cooperation 
with the Bundesbank, Kohl and his finance minister, Theo Waigel, were able to impose the 
German stability culture on the other Member States at the European level and reassure the 
Euroskeptical tendencies of their party-coalition. The voters were newly ideologically bound 
to the European project of the government, owing to the governing parties’ promotion of the 
SGP as a means of furthering fiscal stability in the EU. The attacks of the opposition could 
thus be absorbed as being empty populist rhetoric, since all parties were generally in favor of 
EMU. Nevertheless, it is to the SPD’s merit that the missing “stability organ” was put on the 
agenda of the domestic political discussion.  
 
Academics in Germany were able to influence the agenda building process by getting certain 
issues and their interpretations of them into the media and thereby making them publicly 
available. The manifestos as well as the annual reports of the German Council of Economic 
Advisors shaped ideas – and therefore also influenced the public opinion. However, although 
academics  contributed  to  the  public  debate  and  were  effective  at  promoting  German 
ordoliberalism, they were unable to influence the political decision-making process. 
 
Within  the  agenda-theoretical  framework,  trade  unions  and  employer  associations  can  be 
interpreted as lobbies that are able to influence the process of policy agenda building. In this 
process, voters attempt, via the assistance of lobbies, to let their opinion be known to the 
political  parties.  During  the  negotiations  for  the  SGP,  the  influence  of  the  German  trade 
unions was not very strong, while employer associations and business interest groups tried to 
“piggyback” on the Bundesbank. Therefore, any potential influence they may have exerted   50 
upon the process cannot be adequately evaluated due to these groups’ nearly complete overlap 
with the Bundesbank’s positions.  Suffice it to say that their role was minor. 
 
Turning to the prevailing public opinion in Germany, we now take a look at the opposite side 
of the Agenda process. In the mid-1990s, the German public was very skeptical about EMU 
and  the  introduction  of  a  common  currency.  The  SGP  was  designed  to  overcome  this 
skepticism. This is a clear example of voters utilizing their policy agenda building role to put 
their  concerns  about  European  integration  on  the  political  parties’  agendas.  Therefore, 
German public opinion did indeed play a role and exert an influence on the German position 
during the negotiations. 
 
Finally, integrating the role of the media in the pact’s development, it can be concluded that 
the  media,  being  involved  in  three  out  of  four  Agenda  Theory  processes,  serve  as  the 
communicational forum for all the actors in Germany. The media took up the public fears that 
led to the domestic political pressure that ultimately resulted in the formulation of a stability 
pact. The interplay of the media and the German public can therefore be interpreted as the 
driving force behind Germany’s position. Not only was the public opinion displayed in and 
formed by the media, but also the different actors were represented by the media’s agenda 
setting.  
 
Returning to the initial question, the evolution of the SGP can quite adequately be explained 
by the aforementioned ideas, interests and ideologies of the German media democracy. As we 
have shown, many actors who may not have directly influenced the political decision-making 
process  were  nonetheless  crucial  in  shaping  the  public  debate.  Therefore,  as  regards 
Germany’s role in the negotiations, the Stability and Growth Pact can be interpreted as a 
political response to the various actors’ economic opinions, the public’s skepticism toward the 
European integration process, and the media coverage that amplified these sentiments. 
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